¿Condiciona la ideología de acogida las actitudes de los partidos populistas hacia la UE? Los vínculos entre populismo y euroescepticismo en el sur de Europa by Plaza-Colodro, Carolina et al.
DOES HOST IDEOLOGY SHAPE 
POPULIST PARTIES’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARDS THE EU? The links of 
populism and Euroscepticism in 
Southern Europe
¿CONDICIONA LA IDEOLOGÍA 
DE ACOGIDA LAS ACTITUDES 
DE LOS PARTIDOS POPULISTAS 
HACIA LA UE? Los vínculos entre 
populismo y euroescepticismo en el 
sur de Europa
Carolina Plaza-Colodro
University of Salamanca
cplazaco@usal.es
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9680-3590
Margarita Gómez-Reino
UNED
mgomez-reino@poli.uned.es
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9130-3554
Hugo Marcos-Marne
University of St. Gallen
hmarcosmarne@gmail.com
ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7085-9572 
Revista Internacional de Sociología  RIS
vol. 76 (4), e112, octubre-diciembre, 2018, ISSN-L:0034-9712
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
Cómo citar este artículo / Citation: Plaza-Colodro, C., 
M. Gómez-Reino and H. Marcos-Marne. 2018. “Does 
host ideology shape populist parties’ attitudes towards 
the EU? The links of populism and Euroscepticism in 
Southern Europe”. Revista Internacional de Sociología 
76(4):e112. https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
Copyright: © 2018 CSIC. This is an open-access article 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) License.
Abstract
Can a study of populist parties in Southern Europe shed 
light on the relation between populism and Euroscepticism? 
The proposed comparative framework examines the dif-
ferent degrees and types of Euroscepticism of populist 
parties in the Southern region. We expect that the vari-
ety of populist parties in this region, more oriented to the 
left, will help to expand our knowledge of the links be-
tween populism and Euroscepticism. Overall, our article 
shows that left and right-wing populist parties share what 
may initially look as a homogeneous Eurosceptic profile. 
However, further examination supports that left-wing pop-
ulist parties hold more positive views of the EU in indica-
tors related to the political side of the EU (powers of the 
European Parliament and enlargement).
Keywords
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Resumen
¿Puede un estudio de partidos populistas en el sur de 
Europa arrojar luz sobre la relación entre el populismo y 
el euroescepticismo? Este trabajo comparativo examina 
los diferentes grados y tipos de euroescepticismo de los 
partidos populistas en la región sur, ya que esperamos 
que la naturaleza más variada de los partidos populistas 
en esta región amplíe el conocimiento sobre las relacio-
nes entre el populismo y el euroescepticismo. En gene-
ral, nuestro artículo muestra que los partidos populistas 
de izquierda y derecha comparten lo que inicialmente 
puede parecer un perfil euroescéptico homogéneo. Sin 
embargo, un examen más exhaustivo confirma que los 
partidos populistas de izquierda tienen opiniones más 
positivas sobre el proceso de integración en los indica-
dores relacionados con el lado político de la UE (poderes 
del Parlamento Europeo y proceso de ampliación).
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Introduction 
Contemporary research suggests that populism is 
one of the driving forces behind a profound process 
of realignment taking place in European party sys-
tems since the 2008 Great Recession (Kriesi 2014; 
Pirro, Taggart and Van Kessel 2018). At the national 
level, populist forces have been able to capitalize on 
the crisis of representation triggered by governments’ 
loss of legitimacy, and this environment of “discon-
formity” has paved the way to campaign against the 
political establishment who assured that “Europe is 
good” (Duff 2013: 141). Although contestation direct-
ed towards the European Union (EU) existed before 
(see Hooghe and Marks 2007), the electoral and po-
litical relevance of populist forces sets a new scenar-
io, in which Eurosceptic positions are no longer the 
patrimony of small and marginal political parties. 
Hence, a central piece of the post-2008 political 
scenario relates to the (re)politization of European 
integration as a source of political contestation in 
many member states (Kriesi and Grande 2015 and 
2016). On the demand side, the Eurozone crisis pro-
voked a new wave of Euroscepticism (Usherwood 
and Startin 2013; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; Braun 
and Tausenpfund 2014), and a decrease in support 
for further integration (Hobolt 2014). In spite of the 
intents of depoliticization to inhibit political reactions 
against the EU, discussions over Europe and the 
European integration are not only increasingly ex-
pressed in national public debates (De Wilde and 
Zürn 2012: 138; Hooghe and Marks 2018: 123; 
Börzel and Risse 2018: 20); also, the salience of 
European issues is out of the control of mainstream 
parties (Grande and Hutter 2016: 40; Treib 2014). 
Moreover, political controversies regarding Europe 
in the last decade have generated debates on 
topics like “the question of bailing out of member 
States in need” (De Wilde and Zürn 2012: 138) or 
“the numbers of refugees that should be received” 
(Harteveld et al. 2018: 1), permitting parties to mobi-
lize European issues using different framings. 
Euroscepticism literature largely considers that 
political parties’ attitudes towards the EU, be-
sides strategic considerations, are fundamentally 
shaped by their political ideology (c.f. Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2003 or Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). 
Although this relation is dynamic, there is a gener-
al agreement that radical parties, both on the right 
and left-side of the ideological spectrum, are more 
likely to be Eurosceptic (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
2002; De Vries and Edwards 2009; Halikiopoulou, 
Nanou and Vasilopoulou 2012). From a different 
stream of literature, Rooduijn and Akkerman (2017) 
also underlined that a relation exists between politi-
cal ideological radicalism and populist discourses. 
Triangulating these elements, we should reasonably 
expect that populist parties tend to be Eurosceptic. 
However, as Harmsen (2010) suggests, populism 
and Euroscepticism should be considered in re-
lational terms, that is, “in relation to the particular 
positions occupied by particular parties at particular 
times within their national party systems” (Harmsen 
2010: 338). Can a study of populist parties in 
Southern Europe shed light on the connection be-
tween populism and Euroscepticism? 
We argue in this paper that, despite recent efforts 
(Rooduijn 2018; Della Porta, Kouki and Fernandez 
2017; Carlotti 2017; Harmsen 2010), the relation-
ship between populism and Euroscepticism has 
been largely considered from a “northern-European” 
perspective. Far from claiming that current research 
findings are inaccurate, we aim to complement them 
by focusing on a geographical area that has been 
less explored, and whose populist ideological pro-
file is more dominated by left-wing forces. In doing 
so, we delve into different subtypes of negative at-
titudes towards the EU, investigating to what extent 
political ideology shapes populist parties’ discours-
es towards the EU. 
A comparative framework is proposed to answer 
whether the relationship between populism and 
Euroscepticism is mediated by host ideologies in a 
distinctive manner. We investigate the relationship 
between populism and positions towards the EU 
through a comparison of Southern European populist 
parties in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.1 Overall, 
our article shows that left and right-wing populist par-
ties share what may initially look like a homogene-
ous Eurosceptic profile. However, further examina-
tion supports that left-wing populist parties hold more 
positive views of the EU in indicators related to EU 
performance and EU strengthening (powers of the 
European Parliament and EU enlargement). 
This article is organized as follows: the first sec-
tion discusses the literature on the relation between 
populism and Euroscepticism, focusing on two main 
elements: radicalism and anti-elitism. The second 
section delves into the expected differences caused 
by host ideologies and presents the main hypothesis. 
The third section presents the data utilized, justifies 
the selection of cases and refers to the methodologi-
cal approach. The fourth section discusses the re-
sults, and ending with conclusions. 
The nexus of populism and 
Euroscepticism
Nowadays, it seems uncontroversial to define pop-
ulism as a thin ideology (Mudde 2004) which consid-
ers society to be ultimately separated into two homo-
geneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ 
versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which emphasises that 
politics should be an expression of the general will 
(Stanley 2008; Van Kessel 2014). Populism can be 
reduced in its minimal definition to two core features: 
anti-elitism, which is a central piece of populist and 
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challenger parties (Mudde 2004; Hobolt and Tilley 
2016), and people-centrism. Populism, although far 
from being a new phenomenon (Hawkins and Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017), has proved adept in shaping con-
temporary European politics, particularly in the post-
crisis period, when issues related to European inte-
gration became more relevant than ever (Kriesi 2014; 
Kriesi and Grande 2015, 2016). Poor economic perfor-
mance and particularly high levels of unemployment 
are considered a (mildly) favourable opportunity for 
populist parties in Europe (Kriesi and Pappas 2015), 
and can also explain the rise of hard Eurosceptic par-
ties (Nicoli 2017; Schraff 2017). Building upon the fun-
damental work by Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000 and 
2008), the term ‘Euroscepticism’ is used in this article 
as an encompassing one. Therefore, Euroscepticism 
expresses the idea of contingent or qualified oppo-
sition, but also incorporates outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration. 
Both populism and Euroscepticism have increased 
their importance after the Great Recession (Pirro, 
Taggart and van Kessel 2018), but their coincidence 
does not seem to be purely temporal. 
Research on party-based Euroscepticism sug-
gests that parties on the extremes of the ideologi-
cal spectrum, on both the left and the right, share 
(hard) Eurosceptic orientations (Hooghe and Marks 
2005, De Vries and Edwards 2009), which can occur 
for both ideological and strategic reasons (Taggart 
1998, Ray 2007). Since Rooduijn and Akkerman 
(2017) demonstrated that populist parties are largely 
located at the extremes of the political ideological 
axis, it seems reasonable to assume that they are 
Eurosceptic. From this perspective, it is not left or 
right ideology that influences the Euroscepticism of 
populist parties, but its radical ideological stance. 
By adopting radical positions, populist parties look 
to differentiate themselves from mainstream ones, 
appealing to voters dissatisfied with the status quo 
(Taggart 1998: 382). However, beyond strategic rea-
sons, populism has its own ideological connections 
with Euroscepticism. First, populist parties display a 
strong anti-elite component in their discourses, and 
may find that politicians in Brussels are equally part 
of an elite separated from the people and ‘evil’ in their 
actions. Second, Euroscepticism might be a reaction 
against national-level elites, accused of transferring 
too much power to the EU (Rooduijn 2018). 
Whereas the general connection between pop-
ulism and Euroscepticism seems well defined, the re-
lational nature of the puzzle (Harmsen 2010) strongly 
advises for a more fine-grained consideration of these 
links, testing the stability of these theories across dif-
ferent contexts. In particular, we aim to study the re-
lationship between populism and Euroscepticism in 
southern Europe as we expect that the more varied 
nature of populist parties in this region will shed light 
on the theoretical relations between populism and 
Euroscepticism. Here, we fundamentally refer to the 
different types of populist parties as a function of their 
ideological preferences. Above all, we are interested 
in how left and right-wing populist parties express 
their preferences towards the EU. 
Thick ideologies and 
Euroscepticism. Why is 
Southern Europe different? 
Only a decade ago, Southern Europe was a fer-
tile terrain for pro-European orientations in party 
systems (Llamazares and Gramacho 2007, Verney 
2011, Conti 2003). However, this scenario of Euro-
enthusiast leanings was increasingly undermined 
over this past decade (Serricchio, Tsakatika and 
Quaglia, 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2013; 
Ehrmann, Soudan and Stracca 2013; Roth, Gros and 
Nowak-Lehmann 2014; Braun and Tausendpfund, 
2014; Dotti Sani and Magistro, 2016). South 
European governments have been experiencing 
a series of critical elections since the beginning of 
the Great Recession, which sometimes even lead to 
a party system collapse (Bosco and Verney 2012, 
Morlino and Raniolo 2017). The attribution of re-
sponsibility for the crisis and the implementation of 
adjustment policies, for which the EU is a principal 
actor, were influencing factors in the transforma-
tion of party systems (Magalhães 2013). Crucially, 
the framing of the Euro-crisis in the South permitted 
radical left parties (populist or not), to gain the major 
share of the discontent vote, even in countries where 
populist right parties existed prior to the crisis, as in 
Italy and Greece (Hooghe and Marks 2018: 125). 
The rise of Euroscepticism in the region’s party 
systems is driven by parties that changed the pat-
tern of consensus towards the EU from the left. This 
is illustrated by the emergence of parties such as 
Podemos in Spain, Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal 
and specially SYRIZA in Greece, where a renewed 
debate on the importance of the EU in the domes-
tic public policies contributed to the emergence 
of a new division around the issue of the EU/IMF 
bailouts (Teperoglou and Tsatsanis 2014; Verney 
2015). Nevertheless, the Italian supply-side differs 
from the general South European pattern: it is more 
Eurosceptic because of the Lega Nord’s (LN) transit 
towards hard Euroscepticism (Gómez-Reino 2017), 
and also due to the discourse of the new Movimento 
5 Stelle (M5S) - the only party that has used both 
economic and cultural framings against the European 
Union (Pirro, Taggart and van Kessel 2018: 10). 
Political science scholars are aware that populism, 
as a thin ideology, only refers to a limited number of 
aspects in the political realm. Hence, populism is nor-
mally attached to other thick ideologies, to get a com-
plete discourse that speaks to a broad audience in the 
electoral competition (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
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2013b; Aslanidis 2016; Rensmann, De Lange and 
Couperus 2017; Huber and Schimpf 2017). A funda-
mental thick ideological dimension is the political ide-
ological one, which means that populist parties can 
be found at the right (Mudde 2007), left (March 2011) 
or even centre (Havlik and Stanley 2015) of the ideo-
logical spectrum. This has important consequences 
in terms of policy proposals, as the sub-types of 
populism provided by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2013a) identify inclusive and exclusive forms of pop-
ulism that would correspond, respectively, to the left 
(including the poor) and the right (excluding foreign-
ers).2 Mény and Surel’s (2000) three-fold conception 
of the people: the political (people as sovereign), the 
cultural (people as nation) and the economic (people 
as a class), is of great help to further explore these 
left/right-wing differences.
In Europe, references to the nation are often char-
acteristic of the populist right, while the notion of peo-
ple as a class is stressed by left-wing populism. Thus, 
left and right populist parties differ at least in their 
discursive emphasis. While left-wing populism tends 
to focus on economic issues (March 2011), the right-
wing populist parties emphasize cultural issues as au-
thoritarianism and nationalism (Mudde 2007). Populist 
right-wing parties stress their anti-establishment rhet-
oric, blaming established parties for not solving the 
problems derived from immigration. Left-wing popu-
list parties connect their political anti-establishment 
stance to economic issues, arguing that “hardworking, 
ordinary citizens are betrayed by the political-econom-
ic power elite” (Rooduijn and Akkerman 2017: 200). 
Among the authors that highlight that Eurosceptic 
positions are expected both from left and right 
populist parties (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; 
Rooduijn 2018), Rensmann’s (2017) position should 
be highlighted. Rensmann argues that distinctions 
between left and right populism based on nativism 
versus cosmopolitanism are difficult to empirically 
substantiate in the European context. Accordingly, 
he considers that opposition to non-native groups 
representing globalization is not limited to right-wing 
populist parties (Rensmann 2017: 125). Following 
his argument, European populist parties, despite be-
ing left or right, share not only the discontent claims 
against established politics, but also a homogene-
ous notion of cultural identity – anti-pluralistic and 
anti-universalistic– illustrated by their opposition to 
the “globalized immigration society and their elites” 
(Rensmann 2017: 124-125).
Against this, we join De Vries and Edwards (2009), 
Halikiopoulou, Nanou and Vasilopolou (2012), Van Elsas 
et al. (2016) and Lisi and Tatsanis (2017), in pointing 
out that ideology matters for the concrete expression 
of critical attitudes towards the EU also in populist par-
ties. This is so, we argue, because the different roots of 
distrust towards the EU ultimately condition the intensity 
and type of anti-European discourses. Whereas right-
wing populist parties’ discourses are directed against the 
foundational pillars of the organization (integration and 
borders, see Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Hooghe and Marks 
2018 or Börzel and Risse, 2018), left-wing populist par-
ties concentrate their criticisms on the current economic 
structure of the organization (austerity and liberalism, 
see Gómez-Reino and Plaza-Colodro 2018). Even if 
Kopecky and Mudde state that radical left-wing parties 
can share a wish for international cooperation with a 
Europhobe vision of the EU (Kopecký and Mudde 2002: 
301), we suggest that economic and social criticism to-
wards the EU, as profound as they can be, is essentially 
reconcilable with an intensely reformed EU (see Scharpf 
2002). On the contrary, we join Zaslove (2004 and 2008) 
in proposing that a fundamental contradiction is likely to 
occur between right-wing populist parties and the EU. 
Research on party-based Euroscepticism involves 
two different perspectives - what Mudde calls Sussex 
and North Carolina schools (Mudde 2012). These 
schools differ in definition, scope and findings on 
the parties’ position on European integration. North 
Carolina’s definition considers party-positioning to-
wards the European Integration process as a con-
tinuum that ranges from ‘very positive to very nega-
tive dispositions towards European integration, its 
policies, its institutions or its principles’ (Hooghe and 
Marks 2007:120). On the other hand, the Sussex 
school’s interpretation of Euroscepticism set the main 
difference between hard and soft Euroscepticism by 
attending to the feasible incorporation of the parties’ 
criticism to the organic and legislative structure of the 
EU (Mudde 2012). Delving into this second approach 
is of particular interest for our relational thesis. 
Building upon the hard and soft notions of 
Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2000), dif-
ferences have been found between attitudes of op-
position towards integration as a principle (general 
practice of European integration), and opposition to-
wards the specific ideas of integration underlying the 
EU, to produce a typology that distinguishes between 
Euro-enthusiasm, Euro-rejection, Euroscepticism and 
Euro-pragmatism (Kopecky and Mudde 2002). Euro-
enthusiasts hold a positive view of the principles of 
integration, and also positively assess current policies 
at the EU level. Euro-rejects occupy the opposite pole, 
being both Europhobe (regarding EU main ideas) and 
Euro-pessimist (dissatisfied with where the EU is go-
ing). Eurosceptics agree with the general principles of 
the EU, while at the same time disapprove of the cur-
rent state of things and direction of the EU. Lastly, Euro-
pragmatists do not have a strong opinion about the EU 
principles, but still positively consider its results (ibid 
2002: 302-4). Together with other efforts such as those 
by Flood (2002), Wessels (2007), Vasilopoulou (2009) 
or Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia (2013), these 
classifications share an important implication: relevant 
information is missing if we refer to Euroscepticism as 
a phenomenon structured along a single dimension. 
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Therefore, and even if both left and right populist 
parties may initially display general Eurosceptic posi-
tions, we expect that their thick ideological profiles 
determine different attitudinal approaches to the EU. 
Therefore, we should see that:
H1a. Left-wing populist parties, although at first sight 
Eurosceptic, do not question all the arrange-
ments and the very structure of the EU as a 
whole. 
H1b. Right-wing populist parties hold radical posi-
tions against the EU, questioning the principles 
of the organization.
Data: Populist parties and their 
electoral platforms 
Crucial for our study is the selection of parties 
considered as populist in Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Whereas it is true that no single dataset is avail-
able to measure populist discourses across Europe, 
we can rely on previous works for the operationaliza-
tion of this selection criterion. Here, we have selected 
those parties that are considered populist by at least 
one author, and for which we have found no major 
dispute regarding their populist nature. Departing 
from this, and although not all the parties are equally 
consistent in their utilization of populist statements, 
we have identified the following forces that will be la-
belled as populist for this research: Anexartitoi Ellines 
(ANEL) and Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás 
(SYRIZA) in Greece; Forza Italia (FI), Lega Nord 
(LN) and Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) in Italy; Bloco 
de Esquerda (BE) and Partido Comunista Português 
(PCP) in Portugal; Izquierda Unida (IU) and Podemos 
(Ps) in Spain. Table 1 contains the list of references 
used to justify the inclusion of each party in our selec-
tion. With this, we do not intend to provide an exhaus-
tive and final list of populist parties, but a transparent 
justification of the selected forces.
Party-level data for positions towards the EU and 
ideological profiles were extracted from the Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey (CHES). Due to reasons linked to 
the availability of the questions of interest, we selected 
the 2014 CHES dataset (Polk et al. 2017).3 Descriptive 
statistics for each populist party can be found in table 
2. The first group of variables identifies political par-
ties’ ideology, and contains data on their general left-
right profile (lrgen), as well as their economic (lrecon) 
and socio-cultural (galtan)4 positioning. The former 
two variables reflect the multidimensional nature of 
ideology, separating economic from socio-cultural as-
pects. The second group of variables refers to parties’ 
position towards the EU and contains five questions: 
parties’ general position towards the EU (position); 
parties’ positive or negative assessment of country 
membership in the EU (benefit); parties’ position to-
wards the rights of the European Parliament (ep); par-
ties’ willingness to accept EU intervention in national 
budget matters (budgets); parties’ position towards a 
EU enlargement to Turkey (Turkey). 
Country Party References
Greece ANEL Stavrakakis and Katsambekis forthcoming; Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017; Stavrakakis, Andreadis 
and Katsambekis 2017; Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; Rori 2016; Van Kessel 2015.
Greece SYRIZA Santana and Rama forthcoming; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van 
Kessel 2018; Andreadis and Stavrakakis 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Stavrakakis, An-
dreadis and Katsambekis 2017; Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; Katsambekis 2016; Rori 
2016; Van Kessel 2015; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014.
Italy FI Rooduijn 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Bobba and McDonnell 2016; Verbeek and 
Zaslove 2016; Tarchi 2015; Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug 2014; Fabbrini and Lazar 
2013; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011; Fella and Ruzza 2009; Tarchi 2008; Zaslove 2008.
Italy LN Rooduijn 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Ivaldi, Lanzone and Woods 2017; Akker-
man, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016; Bobba and McDonnell 2016; Verbeek and Zaslove 2016; 
Passarelli 2015; Tarchi 2015; Rooduijn, de Lange and van der Brug 2014; Fabbrini and Lazar 
2013; De Lange 2012; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011.
Italy M5S Rooduijn 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018; Santana and Rama 2018; Ivaldi, Lanzone 
and Woods 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Vittori 2017; Bobba and McDonnell 2016; Ver-
beek and Zaslove 2016; Lanzone and Woods 2015; Tarchi 2015; Fabbrini and Lazar 2013.
Portugal BE Gomez-Reino and Plaza-Colodro 2018
Portugal PCP Gomez-Reino and Plaza-Colodro 2018; Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2016. 
Spain IU Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2016; Marcos-Marne et al. 2017. 
Spain Ps Rooduijn 2018; Santana and Rama 2018; Sola and Rendueles 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 
2018; Marcos-Marne et al. 2017; Ramiro and Gomez 2017; Spierings and Zaslove 2017; Stavraka-
kis, Andreadis and Katsambekis 2017; Vittori 2017; Kioupkiolis 2016.
Table 1.
Identification of populist parties based on literature review
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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low a comparative approach in the terms defined by 
Collier (1993), and we are aware of the limitations this 
method implies regarding generalization (ibid 1993: 
106-107). Nevertheless, it seems of particular interest 
in view of our aims of complementing existing theo-
ries, and pointing out how general approaches might 
be enriched from considering an additional angle of 
the relation between populism and Euroscepticism. 
Does host ideology matter? Left-
right positioning on populist 
parties’ Euroscepticism
Left-Right-wing Populism and 
Euroscepticism in Southern Europe 
Beyond exploring mere inter-group differences be-
tween left-wing and right-wing forces (and consider-
ing the heterogeneity of positions and the number of 
cases included), it seems appropriate to recur to an in-
dividual analysis of the parties on each of the selected 
dimensions. For that, two different scatter-plots will be 
presented in each dimension, containing populist par-
ties’ position towards the EU dimensions (vertical axis) 
and position on the left-right scale (horizontal axis).5 
In each figure the left field contains the distribution of 
parties classified according to their economic ideology, 
whereas the right one classifies them as a function of 
GAL-TAN ideology. The order of the figures follows the 
data and methods section: position towards the EU 
(Figure 1); benefits of the EU for the country (Figure 
2); position towards the powers of the EP (Figure 3); 
position towards budget intervention (Figure 4); posi-
tion towards EU enlargement to Turkey (Figure 5).6
In terms of operationalization, we consider that po-
sition towards the EU, and assessment of the benefits 
of belonging to the EU, are a good reflection of the 
general perception of the organization. The specific 
capacities of the EP, the (un)constrained power of the 
EU to influence national budgets, and the EU enlarge-
ment to Turkey reflect assessments of particular poli-
cies, and are expected to give us a more fine-grained 
distinction of Eurosceptic positions. Whereas the 
first indicator measures to what extent populist par-
ties are willing to favour the powers of the European 
Parliament, the only majoritarian EU institution direct-
ly elected by citizen vote (system-related), the sec-
ond assess the extent to which parties support the 
intervention of the EU on national arenas (economic 
sovereignty-related). As for the last question, we un-
derstand that it indicates that the party perceives the 
basis of the EU project as valid, as it seems largely 
incompatible that parties negating the validity of the 
supranational project are willing to expand the politi-
cal community to new members. In that sense, posi-
tive attitudes towards the enlargement could be read 
as supporting the organization. However, positions 
about the enlargement towards Turkey also reflect 
Taggart’s (1998) different sources of criticism in terms 
of the EU being too exclusive or too inclusive, and 
also of “who belongs to us” (identity politics-related). 
Thus, this question could also be interpreted in terms 
of support towards EU policies, as the negotiations 
with Turkey were active until 2016.
As we propose a study characterized by a small 
number of cases, we will prioritize the presentation 
of data in easily interpretable two-dimension scatter 
plots, recurring to theoretical arguments that build 
upon our theoretical expectations. In doing so, we fol-
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics
Source: Polk et al. (2017)
Ideology EU Position
lrgen lrecon galtan position benefit ep budgets Turkey
GR ANEL 8,78 5,11 8,56 2,22 2,38 3,40 1,22 1,14
GR SYRIZA 2,00 1,44 2,11 3,44 2,22 5,25 1,63 4,17
IT FI 6,71 7,00 7,29 3,43 2,29 4,00 2,14 4
IT LN 8,86 7,29 9,14 1,14 3,00 2,80 1,14 1,14
IT M5S 4,67 3,43 2,57 1,43 3,00 3,25 1,29 1
PT CDU 0,50 0,33 4,17 1,88 2,88 4,80 1,00 5
PT BE 1,33 0,67 0,67 3,13 2,38 5,67 1,33 5,33
SP IU 2,00 1,78 1,40 4,60 2,00 6,13 2,63 5
SP Ps 1,67 1,25 1,75 4,44 2,33 6,00 1,50 4,67
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According to our theoretical framework, populist 
parties are expected to share a general Eurosceptic 
position towards the EU. Surprisingly, we can see 
in Figure 1 that two populist parties do not hold 
a negative general position towards the EU (the 
Spanish IU and Podemos). As for the rest of popu-
list parties, it is true that they all share rather nega-
tive visions of the EU, with no obvious clustering 
Figure 1.
Populist parties’ General Position towards the EU
Figure 2.
Populist parties’ assessment of the benefits of the EU
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between left and right-wing forces taking place. The 
Italian FI shows similar values to SYRIZA and BE, 
whereas the most Eurosceptic parties are ideologi-
cally very heterogeneous (even more if we focus 
on the economic dimension). The second question 
that allows for a general assessment of the EU is 
that which reflects political parties’ perception of 
the EU: being beneficial for the country (1); neither 
beneficial nor harmful (2); or not beneficial for the 
country (3) (Figure 2). It is not surprising to see 
that none of the populist parties considered EU 
membership in purely positive terms. Again, right 
and left-wing populist parties cluster together with 
no clear distinction between them. Overall, and de-
spite slight differences between forces, it seems 
that populist parties indeed tend to be critical of 
the EU, and that no straight line can be drawn from 
one party’s ideological stance to its general posi-
tion towards the EU (left-wing populist parties can 
be mildly or radically against the EU, and the same 
goes for the right-wing populist ones). This situ-
ation reflects reasonably well the first part of our 
H1a and H1b statements, from where we aim to 
consider more fine-grained differences. To do that, 
we recur to populist parties’ positioning on three 
key aspects of the EU: the powers of the EP, the 
EU intervention in budget matters and the enlarge-
ment to Turkey (Figure 3 to 5).
The question about the powers of the EP can 
be read as the willingness of a certain party to ex-
pand the democratic nature of the EU system and 
its institutions. Here, a left-right descending diago-
nal line becomes more apparent, in particular when 
the GAL-TAN dimension is considered. This is in 
accordance with our theoretical expectations, as 
left-wing populist forces, even if they are critical of 
the EU, seem willing to strength transnational insti-
tutions in democratic terms, even if that means giv-
ing up some (political) sovereignty. However, this 
should not be read as left-wing populist parties will-
ing to transfer all kind of powers to the EU. Figure 
4 clearly shows that neither right nor left populist 
parties in Southern Europe are willing to allow the 
intervention of the EU in budget matters. Hence, 
left-wing populist parties seem to agree with state-
ments that support the idea of a more powerful EU 
in political terms (in opposition to right-wing popu-
list parties), whereas both left and right-wing pop-
ulist parties strongly oppose giving up economic 
sovereignty. 
Our last indicator refers to the enlargement of the 
EU towards Turkey. A descending diagonal line can 
be observed in Figure 5, which should be interpreted 
as left-wing populist forces being more in favour of 
Turkey joining the EU. We understand this as an indi-
cator of left populist parties supporting enlargement 
in general, and a multicultural one in particular (that 
is, in inclusive terms). As we have already seen in 
Figure 3, thick ideologies seem to make a difference 
in the fine-grained perception of the EU. 
Figure 3.
Populist parties’ positions towards the powers of the European Parliament
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Populism and Euroscepticism. Relational 
beyond thick ideologies?
We so far proposed that populist parties’ thick 
ideological profile is essential to unravel different at-
titudes towards the EU that may be hidden behind 
a general Eurosceptic posture. Although radicalism 
plays a role in separating populist from mainstream 
parties in their attitudes towards the EU, the specific 
ideological pole occupied by populist forces is also 
important to distinguish how (and how much) they 
dislike the EU. However, to what extent is our argu-
ment fully independent from the regional particulari-
ties of Southern Europe? Besides being traditional 
Figure 4.
Populist parties’ positions on Budget intervention
Figure 5.
Populist parties’ position on EU enlargement towards Turkey
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allies of the European Union, Southern European 
countries have their own group-dynamics in eco-
nomic and political terms, and a textbook example 
of North-South differences is the distinct impact of 
the recent European crisis, arguably a major deter-
minant of political attitudes towards Europe in recent 
times. If the relationship suggested in H1a and H1b 
is truly dependent on the populist parties’ ideological 
positioning, and assuming that the content of the left-
right axis is comparable across countries, we should 
see that left and right-wing populist parties outside 
Southern Europe also behave as expected in H1a 
and H1b. Looking to test the external validity of our 
argument, we incorporated in the analysis two more 
countries in which left and right-wing populist dis-
courses are present: France (Front National, FN and 
France Insoumise, LFI) and The Netherlands (Party 
for Freedom, PVV and Dutch Socialist Party, SP).7 
Regarding general positions, the main observation 
remains that populist parties normally share critical 
views of the EU, and that no major differences can 
be extracted from their ideological positioning (fig-
ures included in the online appendix). Furthermore, 
left and right-wing populist parties in France and The 
Netherlands also share a very critical view of the EU in-
tervention in national budgets. This position is not com-
mon to all political parties in the countries analysed, 
and refers to a fundamental consideration of economic 
sovereignty for populist parties that is not necessarily 
determined by the intervention of the Troika in Southern 
Europe (figures in the online appendix). The most inter-
esting indicators for our comparison are those referring 
to powers of the European Parliament and enlarge-
ment towards Turkey (figure 6 and 7).
What we first observe in these figures is that French 
and Dutch populist right-wing parties cluster together 
with the other right-wing populist forces from Southern 
Europe, holding strong positions against the EU. 
However, the most important part for the generaliz-
ability of our argument is extracted from the location 
of left-wing populist forces, PG and SP, in figures 6 
and 7. Whereas these two parties are located closer to 
other left-wing forces in relation to an EU enlargement 
to Turkey (and are as inclusive in identity terms as 
their South European counterparts), they also come 
closer to populist right-wing forces when assessing 
the powers of the EP. Although this has implications 
for our research, in the sense that the relational nature 
of the puzzle mentioned in the theoretical section is 
even more complex than we expected, it does not im-
ply that thick ideologies have nothing to say about the 
relation between populism and Euroscepticism once 
regional dynamics are considered. For example, if we 
look at CHES data for the years 2010 and 2006 (with a 
more reduced sample of populist parties), we see that 
left and right-wing populist parties also had an indis-
tinguishable general position towards the EU (mostly 
negative). However, if more detailed indicators are 
considered, left-wing populist parties differ from popu-
list right-wing ones. In 2006 and 2010, the former were 
also more in favour of the EP powers and of the EU 
enlargement towards Turkey, which refers to a long-
standing link between left-wing populist forces and a 
nuanced Eurosceptic position (figures to be found in 
the online appendix). Although strategic considera-
tions may help to explain differences in the assess-
ment of EP powers, the thick ideological positioning 
matters when observing populist parties’ attitudes to-
wards the EU even outside Southern Europe. 
Figure 6.
EP powers. South European populist parties plus FN, LFI, PVV and SP
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A different profile? Recapitulation 
The previous results are largely in accordance 
with our theoretical expectations, as left-wing pop-
ulist forces (also critical of the EU) seem willing to 
strengthen transnational institutions in democratic 
terms (EP), even if that means giving up some (po-
litical) sovereignty. Additionally, they also seem sup-
portive of an inclusive (multicultural) European en-
largement. The question remains however, if these 
differences are enough to speak of a different type of 
Euroscepticism. That is, does this different percep-
tion of the EP powers and the EU enlargement justify 
that we call left-wing populist parties less Eurosceptic 
or distinctly Eurosceptic? 
In the same way as “[‘soft’] and ‘hard’ 
Euroscepticism do not do enough justice to the 
subtle, yet important, distinction between the ideas 
of European integration, on the one hand, and the 
European Union as the current embodiment of these 
ideas” (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 300), it is our 
understanding that the differences proposed in our 
article reflect subtle differences that are in line with 
the ideas of specific and diffuse support towards the 
EU (ibid 2002). Given that these differences seem 
significantly affected by thick ideologies, we argue 
that referring to left and right-wing populist parties as 
‘Eurosceptic’ is not totally accurate, when the general 
level of Euroscepticism is left out. 
Departing from the individual level, Boomgarden 
et al. (2011) already stressed the importance of clari-
fying the distinct dimensions comprised within the 
Eurosceptic category, ultimately referring to EU at-
titudes as a collection of multiple dimensions of at-
titudes (ibid 2011: 260). Therefore, and as useful as 
a broad understanding of Euroscepticism can be to 
foster dialogue and comparative efforts in the disci-
pline, its relationship with populism seems well com-
plemented by findings from studies allowing a more 
fine-grained approach to the key concepts: populism 
and Euroscepticism. It is in this regard that we be-
lieve our research to be more relevant, highlighting 
that right and left-wing populist parties actually differ 
when assessing EU performance (EP) and strength-
ening (enlargement). Ultimately, this distinction is 
pertinent to understanding the complexity of posi-
tions towards the EU, a multidimensional polity on its 
own (Boomgarden et al. 2011). 
Conclusions
Our research shows that the study of populist 
parties in Southern Europe sheds light on the rela-
tion between populism and Euroscepticism, com-
plementing recent efforts to disentangle this nexus 
by focusing on a geographical area that has been 
less explored, and whose populist ideological pro-
file is more dominated by left-wing forces. In doing 
so, we delve into different subtypes of negative at-
titudes towards the EU, investigating to what ex-
tent political ideology shapes populist parties’ dis-
courses towards the EU. 
Overall, our article shows that left and right-wing 
populist parties share what may initially look to be 
a homogeneous Eurosceptic profile. However, fur-
ther examination holds that left-wing populist par-
Figure 7.
Enlargement towards Turkey. South European populist parties plus FN, LFI, PVV and SP
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ties hold more positive views of the EU in indicators 
related to the “political side” of the EU (powers of 
the European Parliament and enlargement). This is 
so, we argue, because the different roots of distrust 
towards the EU ultimately condition the intensity 
and type of anti-European discourses also in pop-
ulist parties. Whereas right-wing populist parties’ 
discourses are directed against the foundational 
pillars of the organization (integration and borders), 
left-wing populist parties concentrate their criticisms 
on the current economic structure of the organiza-
tion (economic intervention). Consequently, the de-
mands of the latter are susceptible to be integrated 
within the frame of the EU, whereas the former’s 
question the EU itself.
Returning to the goals of the article, it is not our 
intention to question the general relationship ob-
served between Euroscepticism and populism, 
which has been constructed after thorough analy-
ses and with broad empirical support. However, 
even if populist parties indeed tend to be more 
Eurosceptic than mainstream political parties, popu-
list parties’ assessment of the EU seems mediated 
by thick ideology. This has theoretical implications, 
but it is also relevant for understanding the prac-
tical consequences that the success of different 
populist parties may have in terms of EU legitimacy 
and support. Although some authors consider thick 
(host) ideologies when studying populist parties, 
further empirical works may benefit from taking into 
account the host ideology together with a broader 
understanding of what being Eurosceptic means. At 
the individual level, this distinction may shed light on 
why Euroscepticism is not one of the features unit-
ing voters of populist parties.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the coordinators of this 
special issue and two anonymous reviewers of the 
Revista International de Sociologia for their valuable 
comments. Special thanks go to Ciaran O’Flynn. 
Carolina Plaza-Colodro and Margarita Gómez-Reino 
want to thank the Spanish Ministry of Economy for 
the funding received under the Research Grant 
CSO2013-47667-P and Hugo Marcos-Marne thanks 
the University of St.Gallen for the funding received 
under grant IPF-1031522. 
Notes
1. The other country typically considered in studies of 
Southern Europe, Cyprus, has been left aside due the 
lack of relevant populist discourses. 
2. For Huber and Schimpf (2017) left-wing populist parties 
are more inclusive even considering two subdimensions 
of liberal democracy: political inclusion (minority rights) 
and mutual constraints.
3. The wording of the original questions, as well as the cor-
responding scales, can be found in the online appendix.
4. GAL-TAN stands for Green, Alternative, Libertarian (GAL) 
– Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist (TAN). For more 
information see Hooghe et al. (2002) or Polk et al. (2017).
5. CDU is the name of the electoral coalition including PCP, 
together with the Green party, since 1987. 
6. Original scales have been respected in the figures to im-
prove readability and comparability. Excepting Figure 3 
(ranging from 1 to 3) all the scales range from 1 to 7 (strongly 
opposed to strongly in favor, with 4 as neutral point). 
7. For the definition of Front National as populist see 
Rooduijn (2018); Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018); 
Ivaldi (2018); Spierings and Zaslove (2017); Akkerman, 
de Lange and Rooduijn (2016); Rooduijn, de Lange and 
van der Brug (2014); Mudde (2013); Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2013a); Bornschier (2012); Oesch 2008 and 
Rydgren 2008. For LFI see Hanley (2018); Ivaldi (2018); 
Mény (2017); Rensmann (2017) and Damiani (2016). 
For the Dutch SP see Pirro and Van Kessel (2018); 
Rooduijn (2018); Otjes and Louwerse (2015); Rooduijn, 
de Lange and van der Brug (2014) and March (2007). 
For the PVV see Pirro and Van Kessel (2018); Rooduijn 
(2018); Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2015); Rooduijn, 
de Lange and van der Brug (2014); Akkerman (2011) 
and Vossen (2011).
References
Akkerman, T. 2011. “Friend or foe? Right-wing pop-
ulism and the popular press in Britain and the 
Netherlands.” Journalism 12(8): 931-945. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1464884911415972
Akkerman, T., S. de Lange and M. Rooduijn. 2016. Radical 
Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into 
the Mainstream?. New York: Routledge. ISBN-13: 978-
1138914988 
Andreadis, I. and Y. Stavrakakis. 2017. “European Populist Parties 
in Government: How Well are Voters Represented? 
Evidence from Greece.” Swiss Political Science Review 
23(4): 485-508. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12255
Armingeon, K. and B. Ceka. 2014. “The loss of trust in the 
European Union during the great recession since 
2007: The role of heuristics from the national politi-
cal system.” European Union Politics 15(1): 82-107. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116513495595
Aslanidis, P. 2016. “Is populism an ideology? A refutation and 
a new perspective.” Political Studies 64(1_suppl): 88-
104. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224
Aslanidis, P. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2016. “Dealing with 
populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition 
in Greece.” Democratization 23(6): 1077-1091. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1154842
Benedetto, G. and L. Quaglia. 2007. “The Comparative 
Politics of Communist Euroscepticism in France, Italy 
and Spain.” Party Politics 13(4): 478-499. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354068807077957
DOES HOST IDEOLOGY SHAPE POPULIST PARTIES’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU? . 13
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e112. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
Bobba, G. and D. McDonnell. 2016. “Different Types of 
Right-Wing Populist Discourse in Government and 
Opposition: The Case of Italy.” South European Society 
and Politics 21(3): 281-299. https://doi.org/10.1080/13
608746.2016.1211239
Bornschier, S. 2012. “Why a right-wing populist party emerged 
in France but not in Germany: Cleavages and actors 
in the formation of a new cultural divide.” European 
Political Science Review 4(1): 121-145. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1755773911000117
Boomgarden, H.J., A.R.T. Schuck, M. Elenbaas and C.H. de 
Vreese. 2011. “Mapping EU attitudes: Conceptual and 
empirical dimensions of Euroscepticism and EU sup-
port.” European Union Politics 12(2): 241-266. 
Börzel, T. A. and T. Risse. 2018. “From the euro to the 
Schengen crises: European integration theories, po-
liticization, and identity politics.” Journal of European 
Public Policy 25(1): 83-108. https://doi.org/10.1080/13
501763.2017.1310281
Bosco, A. and S. Verney. 2012. “Electoral epidemic: The politi-
cal cost of economic crisis in Southern Europe, 2010–
11.” South European Society and Politics 17(2): 129-
154. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2012.747272
Braun, D., and M. Tausendpfund. 2014. “The impact of the 
Euro crisis on citizens’ support for the European 
Union.” Journal of European Integration 36(3): 231-
245. https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2014.885751
Carlotti, B. 2017. “The odd couple: analyzing United Kingdom 
Independence Party UKIP and Italian Five Stars 
Movement’s FSM’s European Union EU-opposition in the 
European Parliament EP.” Italian Political Science Review 
48(2): 197-220. https://doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2017.24
Collier, D. 1993. “The Comparative Method.” Pp. 105-119 in 
Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, edited 
by A.W Finifter. American Political Science Association. 
Conti, N. 2003. “Party attitudes to European integration: A lon-
gitudinal analysis of the Italian case”. EPERN Working 
Paper no.13. Brighton, UK: Sussex European Institute.
Damiani, M. 2016. La sinistra radicale in Europa. Italia, 
Spagna, Francia, Germania. Roma: Donzelli.
Dotti Sani, G. M. and B. Magistro. 2016. “Increasingly une-
qual? The economic crisis, social inequalities and trust 
in the European Parliament in 20 European countries.” 
European Journal of Political Research 55(2): 246-
264. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12126
Duff, A. 2013. “On dealing with Euroscepticism.” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), 140-152. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02304.x
Ehrmann, M., M. Soudan and L. Stracca. 2013. “Explaining European 
Union citizens’ trust in the European Central Bank in normal 
and crisis times.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
115(3): 781-807. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12020
Elsas, E. van, A. Hakhverdian and W. van der Brug. 2016. 
“United against a Common Foe? The Nature and 
Origins of Euroscepticism among Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Citizens.” West European Politics 39(6): 1181-
1204. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1175244
Fabrini, S. and M. Lazar. 2013. “Still a difficult democracy? 
Italy between populist challenges and institutional 
weakness.” Contemporary Italian Politics 5(2): 106-
112. https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2013.808009
Fella, S. and C. Ruzza. 2009. Re-inventing the Italian Right. 
Territorial politics, populism and ‘post-fascism’. 
London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-34461-6.
Flood, C. 2002. “Euroscepticism: A problematic concept illus-
trated with particular reference to France”. 32nd Annual 
UACES Conference, Belfast, 2-4 September 2002. 
Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. 2017. Nationalisms in the 
European arena. Trajectories of transnational party 
coordination. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. and C. Plaza-Colodro. 
2018. “Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian par-
ty systems.” Politics 38(3): 344-360. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0263395718762667
Grande, E. and S. Hutter. 2016. “Beyond authority transfer: 
explaining the politicization of Europe.” West European 
Politics 39(1): 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1080/0140238
2.2015.1081504
Halikiopoulou, D., K. Nanou and S. Vasilopoulou. 2012. “The 
paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of 
radical right and radical left euroscepticism.” European 
Journal of Political Research 51(4): 504-539. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.02050.x
Hanley, D. 2018. “Left and Centre-Left in France—Endgame 
or Renewal?.” Parliamentary Affairs 71(3): 521–537. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsx042
Harmsen, R. 2010. “Concluding Comment: On Understanding 
the Relationship between Populism and 
Euroscepticism.” Perspectives on European Politics 
and Society 11(3): 333-341. https://doi.org/10.1080/15
705854.2010.503036
Harteveld, E., J. Schaper, S. L. de Lange, and W. van der 
Brug. 2018. “Blaming Brussels? The Impact of News 
about the Refugee Crisis on Attitudes towards the 
EU and National Politics.” JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 56(1): 157-177. https://doi.org/10.1111/
jcms.12664
Hauwaert, S. M. van, and S. van Kessel. 2018. “Beyond pro-
test and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the ef-
fect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist 
party support.” European Journal of Political Research 
57(1): 68-92. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12216
Hawkins, K. A. and B. Castanho da Silva. 2016. “A head-to-
head comparison of human-based and automated 
text analysis for measuring populism in 27 countries”. 
Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Brigham 
Youung University, Provo, UT. https://www.ceu.edu/
sites/default/files/attachment/event/15587/hawkinssil-
vapolbergapril16.pdf
Hawkins, K. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. “What the 
Ideational Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What 
It Can’t.” Swiss Political Science Review 23(4): 526-
542. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12281
Havlík, V. and B. Stanley. 2015. “New populist parties in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Non-ideological or cen-
trist?” Conference Solving the Puzzles of Populism. 
London, UK.
Hobolt, S. B. 2014. “A vote for the President? The role 
of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European 
Parliament elections.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 21(10): 1528-1540. https://doi.org/10.1080/1
3501763.2014.941148
Hobolt, S. B. and J. Tilley. 2016. “Fleeing the centre: The rise 
of challenger parties in the aftermath of the euro crisis.” 
West European Politics 39(5): 971-991. https://doi.org/
10.1080/01402382.2016.1181871
Hooghe, L., G. Marks and C.J. Wilson. 2002. “Does Left/Right 
Structure Party Positions on European Integration?.” 
Comparative Political Studies 35(8): 965-989. https://
doi.org/10.1177/001041402236310
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks. 2005. Calculation, community 
and cues public opinion on European integration. 
European Union Politics, 6(4): 419-443. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1465116505057816
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e112. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
14 . CAROLINA PLAZA-COLODRO, MARGARITA GÓMEZ-REINO AND HUGO MARCOS-MARNE
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks. 2007. “Sources of Euroscepticism”. 
Acta Politica 42(2-3): 119-127. https://doi.org/10.1057/
palgrave.ap.5500192
Hooghe, L. and G. Marks. 2018. “Cleavage theory meets 
Europe’s crises: Lipset, Rokkan, and the transna-
tional cleavage.” Journal of European Public Policy 
25(1): 109-135. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.20
17.1310279
Huber, R. A. and C. H. Schimpf. 2017. On the distinct effects of 
left-wing and right-wing populism on democratic qual-
ity. Politics and Governance 5(4): 146-165. https://doi.
org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.919
Ivaldi, G. 2018. “Contesting the EU in times of crisis: 
The Front National and politics of Euroscepticism 
in France.” Politics 38(3): 278-294. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0263395718766787
Ivaldi, G., M.E. Lanzone and D. Woods. 2017. “Varieties of 
Populism across a Left-Right Spectrum: The Case of 
the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and 
Five Star Movement.” Swiss Political Science Review 
23(4): 354-376. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12278
Katsambekis, G. 2016. “Radical Left Populism in Contemporary 
Greece: Syriza’s Trajectory from Minoritarian 
Opposition to Power.” Constellations 23(3): 391-403. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12234
Kessel, S. van. 2014. “The populist cat-dog: Applying the 
concept of populism to contemporary European party 
systems.” Journal of Political Ideologies 19(1): 99-118. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2013.869457
Kessel, S. van. 2015. Populist Parties in Europe. Agents of 
Discontent?. London: Palgrave Mcmillan. ISBN 978-1-
137-41411-3.
Kioupkiolis, A. 2016. “Podemos: the ambiguous promises of 
left-wing populism in contemporary Spain.” Journal of 
Political Ideologies 21(2): 99-120. https://doi.org/10.10
80/13569317.2016.1150136
Kopecký, P. and C. Mudde. 2002. “The two sides of 
Euroscepticism: Party positions on European in-
tegration in East Central Europe.” European 
Union Politics 3(3), 297-326. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1465116502003003002
Kriesi, H. 2014. “The populist challenge.” West European 
Politics 37(2): 361-378. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402
382.2014.887879
Kriesi, H. and E. Grande. 2015. “The Europeanization of the 
national political debate.” Pp 67-86 In Cramme, O. and 
Hobolt, S. B. (eds.), Democratic politics in a European 
Union under stress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kriesi, H. and E. Grande. 2016. “The euro crisis: A boost to the 
politicization of European integration?” Pp 240-278 In 
Hutter, S., Grande, E., and Kriesi, H. (eds.), Politicizing 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kriesi, H. and T. S. Pappas (eds.). 2015. European populism 
in the shadow of the Great Recession. Colchester: 
ECPR Press.
Lange, S. de 2012. “New Alliances: Why Mainstream 
Parties Govern with Radical Right-Wing Populist 
Parties.” Political Studies 60(4): 899-918. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00947.x
Lanzone, L. and D. Woods. 2015. “Riding the Populist Web: 
Contextualizing the Five Star Movement M5S in Italy.” 
Politics and Governance 3(2): 54-64. http://dx.doi.
org/10.17645/pag.v3i2.246
Lisi, M. and E. Tatsanis. 2017 “Against Europe? Untangling the 
Links between Ideology and Euroscepticism”. Paper 
prepared for the 113th APSA Annual Meeting, San 
Francisco, CA, August 31-September 3, 2017.
Llamazares, I., and W. Gramacho. 2007. “Eurosceptics among 
Euroenthusiasts: An analysis of Southern European 
public opinions.” Acta Politica 42(2-3): 211-232. https://
doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500180
Magalhães, P. C. 2013. Crisis and party system change: 
Greece, Portugal and others. Retrieved from http://
www.pedro-magalhaes.org/crisis-and-party-system-
change-greece-portugal-and-others/
March, L. 2007. “From Vanguard of the Proletariat to Vox 
Populi: Left-Populism as a ‘Shadow’ of Contemporary 
Socialism” SAIS Review 27(1): 63–77. https://doi.
org/10.1353/sais.2007.0013
March, L. 2011. Radical left parties in Europe. Oxon: Routledge. 
Marcos-Marne, H., C. Plaza-Colodro, M. Gómez-Reino, 
I. Llamazares and K. Hawkins. 2017. “Populist dis-
course, attitudes and discourse in contemporary 
Spanish politics”. ECPR General Conference, Oslo, 
6-9 September 2017. 
Mény, Y. and Y. Surel. 2000. Par le peuple, pour le peuple : Le 
populisme et les démocraties. Paris: Fayard.
Mény, Y. 2017. “A tale of party primaries and outsider candi-
dates: the 2017 French presidential election.” French 
Politics 15(3): 265-278. https://doi.org/10.1057/
s41253-017-0038-5
Morlino, L. and F. Raniolo. 2017. The impact of the eco-
nomic crisis on South European democracies. Cham, 
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mudde, C. 2004. “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and 
Opposition 39(4): 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Mudde, C. 2007. Populist radical right parties in Europe. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C. 2012. The comparative study of party-based 
Euroscepticism: The Sussex versus the North Carolina 
School. East European Politics 28(2): 193-202. https://
doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2012.669735
Mudde, C. 2013. “Three decades of populist radical right 
parties in Western Europe: So what?.” European 
Journal of Political Research 52(1): 1-19. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02065.x
Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013a. “Exclusionary 
vs. inclusionary populism: Comparing contempo-
rary Europe and Latin America.” Government and 
Opposition 48(2): 147-174. https://doi.org/10.1017/
gov.2012.11
Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2013b. Populism. In 
Freeden, M., Sargent, L. T., and Stears, M. (eds.). 
The oxford handbook of political ideologies. Oxford: 
OUP Oxford.
Mudde, C. and C. Rovira Kaltwasser. 2015. “Vox populi or vox 
masculini? Populism and gender in Northern Europe 
and South America.” Patterns of Prejudice 49(1-2): 16-
36. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1014197
Nicoli, F. 2017. “Hard-line Euroscepticism and the Eurocrisis: 
Evidence from a Panel Study of 108 Elections Across 
Europe.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 
55(2): 312-331. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12463
Oesch, D. 2008. “Explaining Workers’ Support for Right-Wing 
Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from 
Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland.” 
International Political Science Review 29(3): 349–373. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512107088390
Otjes, S. and T. Louwerse. 2015. “Populists in Parliament: 
Comparing Left-Wing and Right-Wing Populism in the 
Netherlands.” Political Studies 63(1): 60-79. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1467-9248.12089
DOES HOST IDEOLOGY SHAPE POPULIST PARTIES’ ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU? . 15
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e112. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
Passarelli, G. 2015. “Populism and the Lega Nord”. Pp. 224-239 
in The Oxford Handboook of Italian Politics, edited by E. 
Jones and G. Pasquino. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199669745.013.18
Pirro, A. and S. van Kessel. 2018. “Populist Eurosceptic 
trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands during the 
European crises.” Politics 38(3): 327-343. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0263395718769511
Pirro, A. L., P. Taggart and S. van Kessel. 2018. “The pop-
ulist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: 
Comparative conclusions.” Politics 38(3): 378–390 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704
Polk, J., J. Rovny, R. Bakker, E. Edwards, L. Hooghe, S. Jolly 
and M. Steenbergen. 2017. “Explaining the salience of 
anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for politi-
cal parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey data.” Research and Politics 4(1). https://doi.
org/10.1177/2053168016686915
Porta, D. della, H. Kouki and J. Fernandez. 2017. “Left’s Love 
and Hate for Europe: Syriza, Podemos and Critical 
Visions of Europe During the Crisis”. Pp. 219-240 in 
Euroscepticism, Democracy and the Media, edited by 
M. Caiani and S. Guerra. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-59643-7_10
Ramiro, L. and R. Gomez. 2017. “Radical-Left Populism during 
the Great Recession: Podemos and Its Competition with 
the Established Radical Left.” Political Studies 65(1s): 
108-126. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716647400
Ray, L. 2007. “Mainstream euroscepticism: trend or oxymo-
ron?.” Acta Politica 42(2-3): 153–172. https://doi.
org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500189
Rensmann, L. 2017. “The noisy counter-revolution: 
Understanding the cultural conditions and dynam-
ics of populist politics in Europe in the digital age.” 
Politics and Governance 5(4), 123-135. http://dx.doi.
org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.1123
Rensmann, L., S. de Lange and S. Couperus. 2017. “Editorial 
to the Issue on Populism and the Remaking of Il Liberal 
Democracy in Europe.” Politics and Governance 5(4): 
106-111. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i4.1328
Rooduijn, M. 2018. “What unites the voter bases of populist 
parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 populist 
parties.” European Political Science Review 10(3): 
351-368.
Rooduijn, M. and T. Pauwels. 2011. “Measuring Populism: 
Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis.” West 
European Politics 34(6): 1272-1283. https://doi.org/10.
1080/01402382.2011.616665
Rooduijn, M. and T. Akkerman. 2017. “Flank attacks: 
Populism and left-right radicalism in Western 
Europe.” Party Politics 23(3): 193-204. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354068815596514
Rooduijn, M., S. L. de Lange and W. van der Brug. 2014. A 
populist zeitgeist? Programmatic contagion by populist 
parties in Western Europe. Party Politics 20(4): 563-
575. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068811436065
Rori, L. 2016. “The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: from 
great expectations to no expectations.” West European 
Politics 39(6): 1323-1343. https://doi.org/10.1080/0140
2382.2016.1171577
Roth, F., D. Gros and D. F. Nowak-Lehmann. 2014. “Crisis 
and citizens’ trust in the European Central Bank. Panel 
data evidence for the euro area, 1999–2012.” Journal 
of European Integration 36(3): 303-320. https://doi.org
/10.1080/07036337.2014.886400
Rydgren, J. 2008. “France: The Front National, 
Ethnonationalism and Populism”. Pp. 166-180 in 
Twenty-First Century Populism, edited by D. Albertazzi 
and D. McDonnell. London: Palgrave Macmillan. htt-
ps://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592100_11
Santana, A. and J. Rama. 2018. “Electoral support for left wing 
populist parties in Europe: addressing the globalization 
cleavage.” European Politics and Society 19(5):558-
576. https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1482848
Scharpf, F.W. 2002. “The European Social Model.” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40(4): 645-670. https://doi.
org/10.1111/1468-5965.00392
Schraff, D. 2017. “Regional redistribution and Eurosceptic vot-
ing.” Journal of European Public Policy 26(1): 83-105. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1394901
Serricchio, F., M. Tsakatika and L. Quaglia. 2013. 
“Euroscepticism and the global financial crisis.” JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1): 51-64. htt-
ps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02299.x
Sola, J. and C. Rendueles. 2018. “Podemos, the Upheaval 
of Spanish Politics and the Challenge of Populism.” 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies 26(1): 
99-116. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2017.1304
899
Spierings, N. and A. Zaslove. 2017. “Gender, populist atti-
tudes, and voting: explaining the gender gap in voting 
for populist radical right and populist radical left par-
ties.” West European Politics 40(4): 821-847. https://
doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1287448
Stanley, B. 2008. “The thin ideology of populism.” Journal 
of Political Ideologies 13(1): 95-110. https://doi.
org/10.1080/13569310701822289
Stavrakakis, Y. and G. Katsambekis. 2014. Left-wing pop-
ulism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA. 
Journal of Political Ideologies 19(2): 119-142. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2014.909266
Stavrakakis, Y. and G. Katsambekis. 2018. “The populism/
anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden 
Greece: from discursive divide to emerging cleavage?.” 
European Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1057/
s41304-017-0138-3
Stavrakakis, Y., I. Andreadis and G. Katsambekis. 2017. “A 
new populism index at work: identifying populist candi-
dates and parties in the contemporary Greek context.” 
European Politics and Society 18(4): 446-464. https://
doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1261434
Szczerbiak, A. P. and Taggart. 2000. “Opposing Europe: Party 
systems and opposition to the Union, the Euro and 
Europeanisation”. Working Paper. Sussex European 
Institute. Official URL: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/15424/
Szczerbiak, A. and P. Taggart. 2003. “Theorising Party-Based 
Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement 
and Causality.” European Parties Elections and 
Referendums Network Working Paper, No. 12. http://
aei.pitt.edu/id/eprint/6562
Szczerbiak, A. and P. Taggart. 2008. Opposing Europe? The 
comparative party politics of Euroscepticism: Volume 
2: Comparative and theoretical perspectives. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Taggart, P. 1998. “A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism 
in contemporary Western European party systems.” 
European Journal of Political Research 33(3): 363-
388. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00387
Tarchi, M. 2008. “Italy: A Country of Many Populisms”. Pp. 
84-99 in Twenty-First Century Populism, edited by 
D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592100_6
Tarchi, M. 2015. “Italy: the promised land of populism?” 
Contemporary Italian Politics 7(3): 273-285. https://doi.
org/10.1080/23248823.2015.1094224
RIS  [online] 2018, 76 (4), e112. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGÍA. ISSN-L: 0034-9712 
https://doi.org/10.3989/ris.2018.76.4.18.003
16 . CAROLINA PLAZA-COLODRO, MARGARITA GÓMEZ-REINO AND HUGO MARCOS-MARNE
Teperoglou, E. and E. Tsatsanis. 2014. “Dealignment, de-le-
gitimation and the implosion of the two-party system in 
Greece: the earthquake election of 6 May 2012.” Journal 
of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 24(2): 222-242. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.892495
Treib, O. 2014. “The voter says no, but nobody listens: caus-
es and consequences of the Eurosceptic vote in the 
2014 European elections.” Journal of European Public 
Policy 21(10): 1541–1554. https://doi.org/10.1080/135
01763.2014.941534
Usherwood, S. and N. Startin. 2013. “Euroscepticism as a 
persistent phenomenon.” JCMS: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 51(1): 1-16. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1468-5965.2012.02297.x
Vasilopoulou, S. 2009. “Varieties of Euroscepticism: the case of 
the European extreme right.” Journal of Contemporary 
European Research 5(1): 3-23. Available at: http://www.
jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/106
Verbeek, B. and A. Zaslove. 2016. “Italy: a case of mutating 
populism?”. Democratization 23(2): 304-323. https://
doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076213
Verney, S. 2011. “Euroscepticism in Southern Europe: A diachronic 
perspective”. South European Society and Politics 16(1): 
1-29. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.570124
Verney, S. 2015. “Waking the ‘sleeping giant’ or expressing 
domestic dissent? Mainstreaming Euroscepticism 
in crisis-stricken Greece.” International Political 
Science Review 36(3): 279-295. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0192512115577146
Vittori, D. 2017. “Podemos and the Five-star Movement: Populist, 
nationalist or what?” Contemporary Italian Politics 9(2): 
142-161. https://doi.org/10.1080/23248823.2017.1339935
Vossen, K. 2011. “Populism in the Netherlands after 
Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders compared.” 
Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(1): 
22-39. https://doi.org/10.1080/15705850903553521
Vries, C. E. de and E. E. Edwards. 2009. “Taking Europe 
to its extremes: Extremist parties and public 
Euroscepticism.” Party Politics 15(1): 5-28. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354068808097889
Wessels, B. 2007. “Discontent and European Identity: Three 
Types of Euroscepticism.” Acta Politica 42(2-3): 287–
306. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500188
Wilde, P. de and M. Zürn. 2012. “Can the politicization of 
European integration be reversed?” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 50(s1): 137-153. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02232.x
Zaslove, A. 2008. “Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party 
Type.” European Review 16(3): 319-336. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1062798708000288
Zaslove, A. 2004. “The Dark Side of European Politics: 
Unmasking the Radical Right.” Journal of 
European Integration 26(1): 61-81. https://doi.
org/10.1080/0703633042000197799
CAROLINA PLAZA-COLODRO is PhD candidate at the University of Salamanca. She is part of the research project coordi-
nated by Iván Llamazares ‘Economic crisis, social change and new political parties’ funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness. She also belongs to the Comparative Politics permanent research group of the University 
of Salamanca and Teampopulism coordinated by Kirk Hawkins since 2016. Her research lines are related to the radical, 
populist and Eurosceptic reactions of political parties since the beginning of the Great Recession, with special emphasis 
on parties within the most financially affected countries. 
MARGARITA GÓMEZ-REINO is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia 
(UNED) in Madrid. She is part of the research project coordinated by Iván Llamazares ‘Economic crisis, social change 
and new political parties’ funded by the Spanish Ministry for the Economy and Competitiveness. She has been part of 
Teampopulism since 2014. Her areas of research include the study of nationalist parties in Europe, the Europeanization of 
parties and movements and populist parties. She has recently published Nationalisms in the European Arena: Trajectories 
of Transnational Party Coordination (Palgrave 2017). She is also the author of Ethnicity and Nationalism in Italian poli-
tics (2002) and co-editor with Lieven de Winter and Peter Lynch of Autonomist parties in Europe: Identity politics and 
the revival of the Territorial Cleavage (2006). She has published in journals and contributed to edited volumes on party 
Europeanization, populist parties and party voter links and European integration.
HUGO MARCOS-MARNE is postdoctoral research fellow (IPF) at the Chair of Comparative Politics in the University of St. Gallen. 
His research focuses on political behavior, national identities and populism. He has published on these topics at the Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Ethnicities, National Identities, Revista de Estudios Politicos, Revista Internacional de 
Sociologia and Revista Española de Ciencia Politica among others. His current postdoc research is entitled: “National 
Minorities and Attitudes towards the European Union. Declining support in times of turmoil?” 
